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On Abduction in Design 
Ehud Kroll1, Lauri Koskela2 
1Technion, Israel 
2University of Salford, UK/Aalto University, Finland 
The mechanism of design reasoning from function to form is addressed by exam-
ining the possibility of explaining it as abduction. We propose a new interpretation 
to some definitions of innovative abduction, to show first that the concept, idea, as 
the basis for solution must be present in the inference, and second, that the reason-
ing from function to form is best modeled as a two-step inference, both of the in-
novative abduction pattern. This double-abductive reasoning is shown also to be 
the main form of reasoning in the empirically-derived “parameter analysis” meth-
od of conceptual design. Finally, the introduction of abduction into design theory 
is critically assessed, and in so doing, topics for future research are suggested. 
Aim 
Better understanding of the reasoning mechanism from function to form is 
the main aim of the current investigation. In previous work [1] we studied 
the method of parameter analysis (PA) from the perspective of the proto-
theory of design, which is based on the method of geometric analysis, as 
suggested by Aristotle. It was concluded that certain design “moves” could 
be explained as being deductive, some as regressive, but others were more 
difficult to cast in this logic-based framework and were characterized as 
being compositional or transformational/interpretational. Regressive and 
transformational inferences were of particular interest as they involved 
heuristic reasoning and intuition, notions that are sometimes associated 
with the type of inference called abduction. For example, abductive rea-
soning has been identified with the notions of intuition ([2], p. 33), creativ-
ity and subconscious activities [3]. Of course, abduction has for long been 
discussed in philosophy of science. 
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The structure of the current paper is therefore as follows. After a brief 
discussion of how the core of all design processes—reasoning from func-
tion to form—is treated in some of the design literature, the notion of ab-
duction in science and design is introduced. Then we examine two papers 
that seem central in this area, by Roozenburg [4] and Dorst [5]. Roozen-
burg’s ideas on innovative abduction are presented and analyzed both the-
oretically and through his kettle design example. Next we study Dorst’s 
model of abduction and apply it to the same example. We propose a modi-
fication of both Roozenburg’s and Dorst’s models and relate it back to PA. 
The paper concludes with critical overall assessment of the introduction of 
the concept of abduction into design theory, and in so doing makes some 
suggestions for future research. 
The paper intentionally looks at the “mechanics” of the reasoning in-
volved in creating design solutions in terms of the relevant patterns of in-
ference and what are the constituent entities in each inference. The im-
portant cognitive issues of what drives the inference and where ideas come 
from are briefly touched but not systematically investigated. In addition, 
the activity of evaluating proposed solutions is also left out, as its nature is 
very different from the so-called “synthetic” activity of generating some-
thing new. 
How does form follow function? 
The design principle of form follows function is widely accepted. But how 
is form inferred from function? Ullman ([6], p. 140) suggests that this is 
done by a double mapping process: first from function to concept, and then 
from concept to form. Many interpretations of this sequence are possible. 
The German-school systematic design (e.g., [7]) and variations on this ap-
proach that appear in many design textbooks (including Ullman’s) pre-
scribe a comprehensive functional decomposition stage, followed by find-
ing working principles (concepts) for the various subfunctions and 
combining them into an overall concept (the principal solution), and final-
ly, detailing the form (layout) of the concept in the so-called “embodiment 
design” stage. The working principles usually consist of “physical effects 
+ form”, while the principal solution is defined as an idealized representa-
tion of the structure that defines those characteristics that are essential for 
the functioning of the artifact [4].  
Suh’s axiomatic design framework consists of the functional space and 
the physical space [8]. The former contains functional requirements (FRs) 
and the latter, design parameters (DPs). Mapping FRs into DPs is the core 
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of the design process; but because there can be many mapping techniques, 
the design axioms provide the principles to be satisfied by the mapping to 
produce good designs. Suh does not expand on how solution concepts or 
ideas are generated; rather, he uses many examples of design problems and 
their solution ideas to support the notions of FRs, DPs and the two axioms. 
Another framework, function-behavior-structure or FBS [9], identifies 
several processes within design, such as transforming functional require-
ments into expected behaviors, transforming expected behaviors into solu-
tion structures, deriving actual behaviors from structures, comparing de-
rived with expected behaviors, and responding to unsatisfactory behaviors 
by reformulating the design space (changing the structure, behavior or 
function). However, this descriptive model does not use the notion of 
‘concept’, in the sense of underlying solution ideas, as an explicit constitu-
ent of the design space.  
Parameter analysis, PA [10, 11] models the design process differently: 
it uses function, concept (idea) and form as entities of Ullman’s double 
mapping but at a “smaller scale”. Instead of corresponding to whole stages 
of the design process, PA’s prescription consists of repeatedly moving be-
tween concept space and configuration space, using three distinct activities 
that are repeated many times (Figure 1), and in this sense it is similar to the 
FBS model. The first step, parameter identification (PI), corresponds to 
finding a “parameter” (concept, idea) for resolving a functional issue with 
the evolving design. This concept is mapped into form by the creative syn-
thesis (CS) step, and the last configuration is tested by an evaluation (E) 
step. This last step often results in new functional issues (unsatisfactory or 
undesirable behavior) to be resolved, so the process continues until a satis-
factory solution has been reached. 
 
 
Fig1. The parameter analysis process consists of repeatedly moving between con-
cept space and configuration space by applying parameter identification (PI), crea-
tive synthesis (CS) and evaluation (E) 
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PA is unique in that it places the most emphasis on the PI step. The rea-
soning at the conceptual level is claimed to be so important, that “parame-
ters”—ideas, concepts, operating principles, underlying physical effects, 
etc.—have to be stated explicitly. The E step is considered second in im-
portance, because it involves abstracting from a particular problem to new 
functional issues at the conceptual level. The actual step of giving form to 
the design, CS, is ranked the least important, as intermediate configura-
tions are needed mostly to facilitate the evaluation, and any unsatisfactory 
characteristic of a configuration will be mended in the next cycle. So, alt-
hough the outcome of the design process is certainly a configuration, the 
philosophy of PA is that the reasons, justifications and derivations behind 
the configuration are indispensable when it comes to presenting a design 
solution or studying the process of designing. 
The following examples, although being just fragments of long concep-
tual design processes, demonstrate the nature of reasoning in PA: 
 
Example 1, from [1] 
Deceleration of airborne sensors, dispensed in large numbers from an air-
craft for measuring air properties in the airspace over an area, was needed. 
Three consecutive PA cycles (rephrased for clarity and omitting calcula-
tions and sketches for brevity) were: 
 
PI: Produce a large drag force by using the technology of flexible parachutes. 
CS: A 150-mm dia. canopy made of thin sheet material and cords to suspend 
the sensor. 
E: The canopy may not open because the “pull” is too weak and cords may 
tangle. 
  
PI: Overcome the mid-air opening and cord tangling problems by using a rig-
id parachute. 
CS: A 150x150-mm square base pyramid with the sensor attached to it rigidly. 
E: Compact packaging of the devices is impossible. 
  
PI: Allow compact packaging by using an umbrella-like folding structure. 
CS: Lightweight skeleton with hinges, slides and spring, and thin sheet cano-
py stretched over it. 
E: Unreliable because of the many moving parts and costly to make. 
 
Each PI step contains a function to be satisfied and a concept, solution 
principle, to do that. The function in the first cycle originated from analyz-
ing the design task, but consecutive functions emerge as a result of previ-
ous evaluations. The PI step therefore represents a reasoning step from 
function to concept. CS generates a description of a configuration that real-
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izes the last concept, which is form of course, and E derives the behavior 
of the configuration and points the functional direction for the next PI. 
 
Example 2, from [11] 
The design process of a sensitive tiltmeter [12] for measuring changes of 
the ground angle with respect to the local gravity vector was described. A 
novel configuration emerged, with one regular pendulum coupled mechan-
ically to an inverted pendulum. At this point the configuration was evalu-
ated and the process continued as follows: 
 
E: Friction in the rotational joints must be reduced to ensure the required 
sensitivity. 
  
PI: Minimize friction by using rolling contact instead of sliding. 
CS: Flexural hinges of the appropriate design with near-zero resistance. 
E: The displacement measurement should also be made without friction. 
  
PI: Minimize friction by using a non-contact sensing technology. 
CS: A capacitor-type sensor. 
 
The first E step above is taken from the middle of the design process, 
where a new functional issue has come up. Reasoning from this function to 
a concept follows in PI and from the concept to form, in CS. Evaluation of 
the last configuration reveals a new problem, so another design cycle be-
gins. 
A brief introduction to abduction in design 
An ongoing debate exists in the philosophy of science and other areas re-
garding the nature of abductive reasoning. Peirce [13] is attributed with 
proposing that abduction is a form of “synthetic” reasoning (together with 
induction, but different from the “analytic” reasoning of deduction), while 
focusing on scientific explanation. Researchers still disagree on the exact 
nature of induction [14] and certainly on abduction. Schurz [15] presents a 
thorough classification of abduction patterns, all of which are “special pat-
terns of inference to the best explanation”. He identifies many types of ab-
duction based on three dimensions. The main dimension is the type of hy-
pothesis (conclusion) abduced. The other two are the type of evidence to 
be explained and the cognitive mechanism driving the abduction. Schurz 
refers to “the official Peirce abduction schema” as “factual abduction” of 
the following structure: 
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Known Law: IF Cx THEN Ex 
Known Evidence: Ea has occurred 
----------------------------------------------------- 
Abduced Conjecture: Ca could be the reason 
(1) 
 
Investigations of abduction in relation to design have mostly been car-
ried out by scholars in design theory and artificial intelligence. Both 
streams of research are briefly outlined in the following. 
In design theory, March [16] seminally suggests that abduction, which 
he calls “productive reasoning”, is the key mode of reasoning in design. 
He also points to the confusion and misunderstanding created by not dis-
tinguishing between scientific and design hypotheses, and between logical 
propositions and design proposals. Whereas the goal of science is to estab-
lish general laws, he says, design is concerned with realizing a particular 
outcome. The pattern of abduction proposed by March is: from certain 
characteristics that are sought, and on the basis of previous knowledge and 
models of possibilities, a design proposal is put forward.  
Roozenburg [4] discusses in depth the question whether the reasoning 
towards a tentative description of a design follows the conventional view 
on abduction, or whether it should be defined differently. He argues that 
the commonly presented view, especially in artificial intelligence litera-
ture, deals with “explanatory abductions”, which are good for diagnosis or 
troubleshooting, but that the core of design reasoning follows another type 
of abduction, for which he proposes the terms “innovative abduction” and 
“innoduction” [17]. In fact, says Roozenburg [4], Habermas distinguished 
between explanatory abduction as in (1) and innovative abduction, in 
which the law is not known and needs to be inferred together with the pre-
sumed reason for the evidence, and it was March who did not make that 
distinction. 
A more recent paper by Dorst [5] proposes yet another view on design 
abduction. It claims that there are two types of abduction relevant to de-
sign: abduction-1 which follows a similar pattern to (1), and abduction-2 
which is comparable to Roozenburg’s innoduction. Furthermore, Dorst 
suggests chaining these two inferences into a single reasoning step, which 
is the core of ‘design thinking’.  
In artificial intelligence oriented research on design abduction, the em-
phasis has been on computable abduction models. To some extent this 
work is overlapping with and influenced by design theory research on ab-
duction. For example, Goel [18] proposes to extend (and complicate) 
March’s model if we wish to use it in knowledge-based systems. His ar-
gument is based on the fact that the laws (also called rules or knowledge) 
can have different logical natures; for example, universal or statistical, and 
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this affects the meaning of the abduction pattern. However, the influential 
work led by Takeda et al. [19] on design abduction is based on original in-
sights into design, and the connection to Peirce’s seminal work on abduc-
tion in science seems looser. Abduction is defined as a process making in-
tegrated hypotheses and theories to explain given facts [20]. This 
definition goes beyond Schurz’ classification of abduction [21]. Analogical 
reasoning is applied for computationally supporting abduction [22].  
Alone due to space reasons, the focus of this paper is on the design the-
ory oriented research on abduction. However, the artificial intelligence ori-
ented abduction research is touched in the concluding section on future re-
search needs. 
Analysis of Roozenburg’s model of innovative abduction 
Roozenburg [4] says that explanatory abduction, also called presumption 
of fact, which seems to him as the prevailing view on abduction, is a rever-
sal of deduction, and is not the main reasoning mechanism in design. De-
duction is: 
 
p  q (a given rule, IF p THEN q) 
(2) p (p is a given fact, a case or cause) 
----------------------------------------------------- 
q (q is the conclusion, the result) 
 
Reversing it, we get the following pattern: 
 
p  q (a given rule, IF p THEN q) 
(3) q (q is a given fact, a result) 
----------------------------------------------------- 
p (p is the conclusion, the case or cause) 
 
This is the definition of explanatory abduction, similar to (1). According to 
Roozenburg, pattern (3) is not the main reasoning form in design, where in 
fact the only given is a desired result, and both the rule and the cause need 
to be discovered. His innovative abduction therefore follows the pattern: 
 
q (q is a given fact, a desired result) 
(4) 
----------------------------------------------------- 
p  q (a rule to be inferred first, IF p THEN q) 
p (p is the conclusion, the cause, that immediately 
follows) 
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Pattern (4) is the real abduction in design because it represents reasoning 
from a desired result, a purpose or function, to form and use. Form and use 
are the ‘principal solution’, the structure of the artifact and its way of use 
that define its function. 
Roozenburg demonstrates the above through the following example of 
designing a kettle. The purpose, function, is to boil water. The mode of ac-
tion (defined as ‘using laws of nature to produce a desired effect’), or func-
tional behavior, is heating the bottom of the kettle and conducting the heat 
to the water inside. This will be facilitated by the way of use (also called 
‘actuation’) of filling the kettle with water and placing it on a burner. Fi-
nally, to allow all this, the kettle must have a specific form: hemisphere 
with opening at the top and metal construction. 
Now that there are four distinct entities involved in the reasoning (func-
tion, mode of action, way of use, and form), Roozenburg groups together 
form and way of use into one entity, claiming that they always go hand in 
hand, so he writes: 
 
form + way of use  mode of action  function (5) 
 
or in other words: hemisphere and metal + fill with water and place on 
burner  heat bottom of kettle and conduct heat to the water inside  boil 
water. 
Next, the intermediate result (mode of action) in expression (5) can be 
omitted, so what is left is: 
 
form + way of use  function (6) 
 
or: hemisphere and metal + fill with water and place on burner  boil wa-
ter. 
The function (boil water) is given in design, says Roozenburg. What 
needs to be designed is usually considered to be the form (hemisphere and 
metal). But a description of form is not enough to predict the behavior 
which fulfills the function. The behavior (mode of action) depends on form 
but also on the way of use. So, the designer needs to develop ideas on way 
of use together with form. It follows that the “kernel of design” is the rea-
soning from function to form + way of use. This, according to Roozenburg, 
follows the same pattern of reasoning as Habermas’ innovative abduction, 
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q boil water (the only given is the function) 
(7) 
----------------------------------------------------- 
p  q IF hemisphere and metal + fill water and place on 
burner THEN boil water (IF form + way of use THEN 
function; the rule to be inferred first) 
p hemisphere and metal + fill water and place on burner 
(form + way of use; the second conclusion) 
 
The meaning of the last logical derivation is that if you want to boil wa-
ter, you need to ‘discover’ the first conclusion (hemisphere and metal form 
+ filling water and placing on burner way of use  boil water function), 
and immediately you will get the second conclusion (hemisphere and met-
al form + filling water and placing on burner way of use). The second con-
clusion constitutes the principal solution to the design problem. 
Critique of Roozenburg’s model 
The question regarding Roozenburg’s presentation is whether the designer 
who wants to boil water can generate the ‘rule’ in the first conclusion di-
rectly, without reasoning about the mode of action (heating the bottom of 
the kettle and conducting the heat to the water inside) first. Roozenburg’s 
description does not include the mode of action explicitly, assuming per-
haps that somehow the designer has gained the insight on using the specif-
ic mode of action, which is the main characteristic of the principal solu-
tion, and now proceeds according to pattern (7). In other words, we could 
modify Roozenburg’s presentation of abduction to the following (where 
the underlined addition of the mode of action, the operating principle, 
makes it explicit): 
 
q boil water by heating the bottom of a container and 




p  q IF hemisphere and metal + fill water and place on 
burner THEN boil water by heating the bottom of a 
container and conducting the heat to the water (the first 
conclusion) 
p hemisphere and metal + fill water and place on burner 
(the second conclusion) 
 
But this raises two new questions: (a) where did the mode of action 
come from in the first place, and should it not be an explicit abductive step 
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by itself in the description of the “kernel of design”? and (b) does pattern 
(8) represent what really happens during design? 
To answer these questions, let us try to imagine the thought process 
while designing a kettle. We need to design a device to boil water (but in a 
certain context, of having at our disposal a burner, and the boiled water 
will be used to make tea, as opposed for example to generating steam in a 
sauna). What operating principle can we use? Here is an idea: we need 
some sort of container that can be filled with water and placed over the 
burner. Then the bottom of the container will be heated, and the heat will 
be conducted to the water inside (note that we came up with a mode of ac-
tion – heating the bottom of the water container and conducting the heat to 
the water, and way of use – filling the container with water and placing it 
on the burner). Now that we have decided on these (mode of action + way 
of use), we ask ourselves what form we should give the device to work 
properly (that is, a form that when used as intended – filled with water and 
placed on burner – will result in the intended mode of action, conducting 
the heat to the water). The answer now is, use a hemisphere with opening 
at the top and make it out of metal. 
The reasoning above is clearly from function to mode of action + way 
of use first, followed by reasoning from mode of action + way of use to 
form. Roozenburg represents this process as a single innovative abduction, 
wherein the mode of action is implicit, so it gives the impression that the 
main idea (mode of action) is not part of the abduction at all. Moreover, 
Roozenburg combines way of use with form into a single entity, as if they 
are inseparable. 
A more correct way to represent the above reasoning process may be by 
a two-step or double innovative abduction to capture the fact that two dis-




q boil water (the function) 
(9) 
----------------------------------------------------- 
p  q IF fill water and place on burner so heat is conducted 
to water THEN boil water (the first conclusion: way of 
use + mode of action  function) 
p fill water and place on burner so heat is conducted to 
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2nd step: 
 
q fill water and place on burner so heat is conducted to 
water (the newly generated way of use + mode of  
action is now the given) 
(10) 
----------------------------------------------------- 
p  q IF hemisphere with opening and metal THEN fill  
water and place on burner so heat is conducted to water 
(the first conclusion: form  way of use + mode of  
action) 
p hemisphere with opening and metal (the second  
conclusion: form) 
 
To summarize, the above two-step reasoning allows inferring from 
function to an idea, concept or solution principle (showing as way of use + 
mode of action) first, and from that principle, to the form. In general we 
can say that each innovative abduction reasoning step of pattern (4) in-
volves two entities, p and q, but design reasoning should involve four enti-
ties: function, mode of action, way of use, and form. And although we 
claim that mode of action and way of use seem to frequently show togeth-
er, so they can be counted as one entity, the three remaining entities still 
require two inferences, not one. What Roozenburg did is actually leaving 
out mode of action and grouping form and way of use into one entity, 
claiming that together they are the sought solution, so he could reduce the 
problem to a two-entity single abduction. 
Support for the insight that four entities should be involved in describ-
ing design reasoning can be found in the work of Zeng and Cheng [19], 
which Roozenburg claims arrived at similar conclusions to his. Zeng and 
Cheng argue that design reasoning involves three entities: form, function 
and environment, and that the environment consists of two entities: laws of 
nature and actions of nature. If laws of nature are Roozenburg’s mode of 
action, and actions of nature are his way of use, then we have a one-to-one 
correspondence of the four entities. 
Analysis of Dorst’s model of double abduction 
Dorst [5] explains ‘design thinking’ as double abduction, assisted by 
‘frame creation’, which itself is facilitated by ‘theme exploration’. His 
presentation of abduction revolves around the following logical expres-
sion: 
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what (the artifact) + how (the working principle)   
value (aspired) (11) 
 
in which the (aspired) value is always given. If the how is also given, we 
generate the what by a so-called abduction-1, which is precisely the ex-
planatory abduction of pattern (3). Dorst calls this case “conventional 
(‘closed’) problem-solving that designers often do”. If, however, the how 
is not given, then we have a more ‘open’ problem in which we need to de-
cide on both the working principle and the artifact. This is accomplished 
by abduction-2, as in pattern (4), which is the same as Roozenburg’s inno-
vative abduction. Abduction-2 is carried out by first developing or adopt-
ing a ‘frame’ (after Schön), which is a “general implication that by apply-
ing a certain working principle we will create a specific value”. 
Interestingly, Dorst characterizes the framing activity as being “a form of 
induction”, because it is reasoning back from consequences (this is in con-
flict with Peirce to whom that kind of reasoning represents abduction). 
With the help of framing, abduction-2 takes place according to the follow-
ing pattern: 
 
q (q is the given desired value) 
(12) ----------------------------------------------------- p  q (IF how THEN value, the first conclusion) 
p (how, the second conclusion) 
 
When a possible or promising frame has been proposed and the how is 
known, says Dorst, abduction-1 can take place to design the what, the arti-
fact. 
Critique of Dorst’s model 
Let us now apply Dorst’s double-step reasoning process (abduction-2 fol-
lowed by abduction-1) to Roozenburg’s kettle example. Surely, the value 
in expressions (11) and (12) corresponds to function, and the what in (11) 
corresponds to form (Dorst calls it the ‘object’ or ‘thing’). The how, there-
fore, must stand for the way of use + mode of action (also to be in agree-
ment with Zeng and Cheng on having four entities involved in design rea-
soning). If we set value = “boil water” as the only known fact, abduction-2 
may yield a possible working principle, a how, which is the following way 
of use + mode of action: “fill water and place on burner so heat is conduct-
ed to water”. So far this is identical to expression (9). 
Now we need to design the what, or form, and Dorst suggests that this 
will be done by abduction-1 because we know the value and how in ex-
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pression (11). For abduction-1 to take place according to pattern (3), how-
ever, the conclusion should appear as the premise of the given rule, and 
this does not seem to be the case here. The what is still unknown, and of 
course this is why this kind of explanatory abduction cannot be the main 
form of reasoning in design. The only possibility is to use abduction-2 
again, starting with the only known, the how found in the previous step, 
and using it as the given to seek a “rule” to tie together a what (form) to 
this how (working principle), and therefore inferring that what. The result-
ing inference is identical to expression (10). 
The double innovative abduction in parameter analysis 
Having modified Roozenburg’s and Dorst’s models of reasoning from 
function to form to two innovative abduction (or abduction-2) inferences, 
as in (9) and (10), allows us to compare this model with PA. As explained 
and demonstrated earlier, PI is reasoning from a functional aspect to a so-
lution principle, which is equivalent to the first innovative abduction as in 
(9). The solution principle (concept) consists of way of use + mode of ac-
tion. The second step is CS, where the reasoning begins with the solution 
principle derived in PI and ends with a configuration, structure, or form, as 
in (10). Overall we obtain the double mapping function  concept  
form.  
The examples of PA described earlier can easily be presented as such 
double abductions. For instance, the first cycle of Example 1 will be: 
 
1st step, PI: 
 
q produce a large drag force (the function) 
(13) 
----------------------------------------------------- 
p  q IF the sensor is suspended by cords from a flexible 
parachute THEN a large drag force will be produced 
(the first conclusion: way of use + mode of action  
function) 
p suspend the sensor by cords from a flexible parachute 
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2nd step, CS: 
 
q suspend the sensor by cords from a flexible parachute 
(the newly generated way of use + mode of action is 
now the given) 
(14) 
----------------------------------------------------- 
p  q IF a 150-mm dia. canopy made of thin sheet material 
and cords THEN the sensor will be suspended from a 
flexible parachute (the first conclusion: form  way of 
use + mode of action) 
p a 150-mm dia. canopy made of thin sheet material and 
cords (the second conclusion: form) 
 
Conversely, we can formulate the double abduction of the kettle example, 
expressions (9) and (10) as PA: 
 
PI: Boil water by filling water in a container and placing it on a burner so the 
heat is conducted to the water. 
CS: Hemisphere with opening and made of metal. 
E: ... 
Discussion 
Reasoning from function to form may be productively modelled in terms of 
two creative leaps, each requiring an abduction-2/innovative abduction 
reasoning step. The first infers the working principle to be used to attain 
the desired function, and the second infers the artifact that can utilize the 
working principle. The pattern of abductions involved is very different 
from explanatory abduction, so having a special name for this kind of rea-
soning seems justified. 
Working principle or concept comprises of way of use + mode of ac-
tion. The mode of action is much more fundamental to the reasoning than 
the way of use. In fact, way of use may be trivial in many cases, so it may 
not appear in the description of the inferences. Deployment of the sensor 
suspended from the parachute in Example 1 and letting them both descend 
slowly is the obvious way of use in the overall setting of the design task. 
The way of use of filling water and putting the water-filled kettle over a 
burner is also trivial, because the initial problem statement should have in-
volved a burner as the source of thermal energy (and not, for instance, 
electricity) and the purpose of boiling the water (for making tea we may 
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want to contain the boiled water, as opposed to producing steam in a sau-
na). 
The importance of explicitly including the mode of action in the infer-
ence cannot be overstated. When the designer thinks in conceptual terms 
about physical and working principles, the designed artifact will be based 
on a solid ideational foundation. Alternative working principles may be 
thought of, the rationale of the design will be captured better for possible 
use in the future, and deeper understanding of the problem domain will be 
gained by the designer. For example, the choice of metal construction in 
the form of the kettle may be modified according to the mode of action of 
heating the bottom and conducting the heat to the water inside; perhaps by 
looking for materials with high thermal diffusivity or combining a heat 
conducting material for the bottom and a heat insulating material for the 
sides of the kettle. 
Dorst [5] specifically refers to this issue. When describing the pattern 
of abduction-2 as in (11) he says: “students and other novice designers can 
be seen to almost randomly generate proposals for both the ‘how’ and the 
‘what’, and then seek to find a matching pair that does lead to the aspired 
value”. In our experience, the issue is not the random trial-and-error pro-
cess, but rather an attempt to reason from function (aspired value) directly 
to form (the what), without the intermediate step of reasoning about the 
concept (the how).  
Having proposed a double innovative abduction/abduction-2 model, we 
may ask whether explanatory abduction/abduction-1 exists in design at all. 
While March and some other researchers seem to refer to only this type of 
abduction in the context of design, we have shown that both generating a 
concept (working principle) and an artifact (form) require abductive rea-
soning with only one fact, the desired value, as a given. In both cases a 
rule needs to be inferred first, and the premise of the rule immediately fol-
lows. The two inferences do not share the same desired value: when gen-
erating a working principle, the value is the function; when generating the 
form, the value is the working principle of the previous step. However, we 
can imagine situations where the working principle is taken as a given, re-
sulting in abduction of pattern (3) occurring. These seem to be cases in 
which the problem situation is so familiar to the designer that the working 
principle is taken for granted and becomes implicit in the reasoning. For 
example, a structural engineer who regularly designs apartment buildings 
may specify an I-section (form) for the ceiling-support beam (implied 
function of carrying bending loads) directly, without consciously thinking 
of the working principle of increasing the section’s second moment of area 
by placing most of the material away from the neutral axis.  
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But the above argument does not necessarily imply that innoduc-
tion/abduction-2 occur only in innovative design situations. Pattern (4) of 
reasoning, in which the ‘rule’ part (be it concept  function or form  
concept) is not considered a given, can in fact take place in two very dif-
ferent circumstances. First, in the more routine design situations, many ap-
plicable ‘rules’ may exist in the designer’s repertoire, and the abductive 
step is required to select among them. For example, this may apply to the 
ceiling-support beam case, when the design requirements are slightly 
changed and the designer recalls form  concept rules concerning also C-
sections and rectangular-tube sections. Magnani [24] has called this kind 
of inference, where one selects from a set of known rules, selective abduc-
tion. Second, in what may be termed “innovative design” situations, the 
‘rule’ simply does not exist (either in the particular designer’s mind, or 
universally) and needs to be ‘discovered’. For example, if the ceiling-
support beam is required to also provide an easy or aesthetic connection to 
glass walls, the designer may invent a new section shape that is different 
from ‘standard’ or existing shapes. Inference of a new concept  function 
rule seems even more innovative, as it implies discovering a new working 
principle to satisfy a function. Consider for example the first time houses 
were built out of shipping containers, or the still-futuristic concept of get-
ting to space with an elevator. 
As a conclusion, we propose here to modify the general model of de-
sign reasoning from function to form to the following two-step inference of 
the innovative abduction type that explicitly includes the concept, working 




q given: function 
(15) ----------------------------------------------------- p  q first conclusion: IF concept THEN function 




q given: concept 
(16) ----------------------------------------------------- p  q first conclusion: IF form THEN concept 
p second conclusion: form 
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Additionally, we showed how the parameter identification and creative 
synthesis reasoning steps in the conceptual design method called “parame-
ter analysis” correspond to the above two steps.  
Critical assessment and the way forward 
Clearly, this is not intended to be the definitive and complete treatment of 
abduction in design. Just as understanding of abduction in philosophy and 
other areas still evolves, researchers in design have to develop further un-
derstanding of this fundamental notion. In doing so, problems originating 
both from understanding of abduction in science, and from the adoption of 
abduction in design have to be overcome. In general, while especially 
March’ and Roozenburg’s treatments of abduction can be considered sem-
inal and have stimulated further research, they leave room for several criti-
cal remarks. These are not meant to downplay the value of the early treat-
ments but rather emphasize the generative value of them. 
The central motivation for defining abduction, from Aristotle to Peirce, 
has been to cover for logical inferences that cannot be classified as either 
inductions or deductions. However, this demarcation is made challenging 
by the situation that still it is not at all clear what induction is, as stated by 
Vickers [14]: “attempting to define induction would be more difficult than 
rewarding”. Further, Vickers contends that there is no comprehensive theo-
ry of sound induction, no set of agreed upon rules that license good or 
sound inductive inference, nor is there a serious prospect of such a theory. 
That induction is not a settled concept makes it indeed difficult to gauge 
what is outside induction and deduction. 
However, there is more to abduction than revealed in logical analysis. 
Already from Peirce onwards, abduction has been connected to intuition 
and creativity. There has been much research on these two phenomena as 
such, but there seems to have been very little scholarly attention specifical-
ly on the creative and/or intuitive aspects of abduction. These connections 
need to be cultivated and expanded for added understanding. Indeed one 
question is whether we need to set criteria regarding or at least 
acknowledge its intuitive and creative character when defining abduction. 
In recent literature, Hoffman [25] seems to have moved into this direction. 
In this context, two further questions arise: Is all creativity in science or 
design channeled through abductive inferences? Is creative abduction al-
ways based on intuition? 
With its origin in the scientific method, the main type of abduction has 
generally been identified as backwards (regressive) reasoning, essentially 
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through guessing, from consequences to hypothetical causes (in opposition 
to induction and deduction). In design, regressive and deductive inferences 
along means-ends hierarchies are prominent forms of reasoning. However, 
there are also other mental moves, such as decomposition and composi-
tion, as well as transformation [26]. Can we recognize cases in these other 
design moves that are in essential respects similar to abduction, that is, 
creatively pinpoint a solution candidate or at least the direction to it? This 
important question is closely related to the call for classification of differ-
ent types of design abduction, to be presented below. 
In discussions on abduction in philosophy of science, there is a fixation 
to the syllogistic form of abduction, although already Peirce [13] down-
played syllogism as “the lowest and most rudimentary of all forms of rea-
soning”. Schurz [15] cogently argues that there exist rather different kinds 
of abduction patterns; while some of them enjoy a broad discussion in the 
literature, other important patterns have been neglected. This fixation to 
the syllogistic form of abduction has been inherited to treatments of design 
abduction. The far more common way of conceptualizing design as moves 
along means-ends hierarchies [27] is rarely analyzed from the perspective 
of abduction. To the same effect, Niiniluoto [28] discusses the foundation-
al role geometrical analysis has played as a model of reasoning in science, 
covering also abductive inferences in that analysis. However, the philo-
sophical discussions on abduction rarely acknowledge this. The same 
complaint can be presented regarding the literature on design abduction. 
The generic juxtaposition of the terms explanatory abduction and inno-
vative abduction, as suggested by Roozenburg (under influence from Ha-
bermas), is not the best possible, as in science all abductions target expla-
nation. The terms selective abduction and creative abduction, suggested by 
Magnani [24], are better in this respect, although as Magnani himself con-
cedes through his examples, the borderline between these is fluid. 
Roozenburg, and also we in this paper, use the hypothetical example of 
design of a metal kettle in the imagined situation that the world would be 
otherwise as it is now but the kettle would never have been invented. This 
raises the question how kettles have actually been designed? Before metal 
kettles, ceramic kettles were used [29], thus metal kettles probably have 
emerged just through switching over to metal as material. Although sche-
matic examples are often good for purposes of presentation and demon-
stration, the advancement of scientific understanding on abduction requires 
the examination of abduction-like inferences in design as they occur in 
practice. Perhaps, in this way, a thorough classification, as done by Schurz 
[15] for scientific abductions, could be carried out for design abductions. 
Interestingly, already the work of Takeda et al. [22] has challenged the 
completeness of Schurz’ classification from a design viewpoint. The at-
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tempt of Ullah et al. [30] to connect the notion of “classical abduction” as 
in (3) to the C–K Theory of design is another example of research endeav-
oring to interpret abduction from a design viewpoint. They conclude that 
conceiving a creative (“undecided” relative to existing knowledge) concept 
is more complex than abduction, being a motivation-driven process. Moti-
vation here consists of a “compelling reason”—why a certain concept is 
pursued, and an “epistemic challenge”—seeking new knowledge.  
Finally, as discussed above, design abduction research falls into two 
main fields, design theory and artificial intelligence. While these two liter-
atures are partially overlapping, there seems to be room for greater mutual 
awareness as well as for better synthesis of results.  
The multitude of problems related to abduction in general and specifi-
cally to design abduction may initially seem overwhelming. However, they 
all give direction for future research, relevant for the advancement of the 
field. 
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